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I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.
Richard Feynman1
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1 Introduction
It is now about 100 years ago that Erwin Schrödinger2 published his quantum theory, a few 
months after Heisenberg3 had published his. Very soon Schrödinger gave a proof that both 
formalisms are physically equivalent. Thus, for almost 100 years now the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics seems clear. For the same time there has been a dispute, however, about the 
interpretation of that formalism, which is not settled yet even after 100 years. How is that pos-
sible, after those 100 years of extremely successfully applying quantum mechanics in physics 
as well as in technology? 
Why is it that a physical formalism needs an interpretation at all? In classical mechanics it 
seems entirely clear how the results of the formalism have to be connected with empirical 
findings. Nobody ever called especially for an “interpretation” of classical mechanics. But for 
quantum mechanics that is different: The result of a quantum mechanical calculation is usu-
1 Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law (1965). Transcript of the Messenger Lectures at Cornell 
University, presented in November 1964. London etc. (Penguin) 1992. Chapter 6, “Probability and Uncer-
tainty — the Quantum Mechanical View of Nature,” p. 129
2 Schrödinger, E.: 1926. Ann.Phys. 79 ,361, 489, 734; 80, 437; 81, 109
3 Heisenberg, W.: 1925: Zeitschrift für Physik 33, p. 879
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ally not the value of an observable but typically a probability or a probability density. So the 
question arises what that means from the viewpoint of physics—it calls for an interpretation. 
What I attempt here is making understandable what quantum theory really says. It will be 
different from most well-known “popular” accounts of quantum theory, in that I do not want 
to present you that “miraculous” modern physics. Many popular descriptions of quantum the-
ory concentrate on presenting a kind of curiosity cabinet with news like “a particle can be a 
wave as well” or “a particle might be at different places at the same time” or “quantum theory 
allows instant transfer of information over large distances”. Curios like that distort what quan-
tum theory really says, and they reliably prevent any understanding of that theory. I will try to 
clarify, instead, what quantum theory is about and what it says—in rather sober words that 
give really a better “understanding”.
Thus, I am doing something similar to what Leonard Susskind and Art Friedman do in their 
‘Quantum Mechanics. The Theoretical Minimum.’4 Their excellent account introduces into 
physical essentials of quantum theory whereas this text attempts to give an introduction on 
how to understand quantum theory, contrary to Feynman’s quote in the beginning. Whether 
Feynman is right depends, evidently, on what we understand by understanding. This is actu-
ally a philosophical question. The answer might become clearer in the course of this text. 
2 Quantum vs. “Classical” Ontology
Classical ontology assumes that there is a nature “out there” we can watch and describe 
like one would describe e.g. the works of a clock. This view is described classically by P.S. 
Laplace5:
"Une intelligence qui, pour un instant donné, connaîtrait toutes les forces dont la nature est 
animée, et la situation respective des êtres qui la composent, si d'ailleurs elle était assez vaste 
pour soumettre ces données à l'analyse, embrasserait dans la même formule, les mouvements 
des plus grand corps de l'univers et ceux du plus léger atome : rien ne serait incertain pour 
elle, et l'avenir comme le passé, serait présent à ses yeux."6
If you look close enough you can see that quantum theory is different from that picture. That 
is what I think leads many people to finding quantum theory so strange. What you can get 
from quantum theory is a system of predictions for possible measurements, and those predic-
tions do not generally give certainty to an outcome but admit different possible outcomes with 
respective probabilities. It is true, probabilities occur in classical physics as well. But there 
one can always comfort oneself with the idea that “in reality” one outcome was certain, only 
the information the physicist had was not sufficient to obtain that “real” outcome. In quantum 
theory, this way out is barred. No quantum state that describes a system is such that it gives 
definite values to all observables. It rather gives for most observables predictions and, in the 
optimal case, for every possible result a probability for finding that result. Thus, we have to 
4 Leonard Susskind and Art Friedman, Quantum Mechanics. The Theoretical Minimum. London (penguin) 
2015
5  Pierre Simon de Laplace, Essai philosophique sur les probabilités. Paris 1814
6 English version [MD]: “An intelligence which, in a given instant, knew all forces that animate nature and the 
correlations of the beings it is made up of; if it were, besides, huge enough to analyze these data, it would 
comprise in the same formula the movement of the largest bodies of the universe as well as those of the light-
est atom: Nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future like the past were present before its eyes.”
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admit that quantum theory is a fundamentally indeterministic theory. That insight forces us to 
abandon the “classical” picture of a world “out there” comparable to a clock work.
Is that a drawback, compared to the “classical” ontology? We have to reflect on what we re-
ally expect of science: science should enable us to predict what will happen, using empirical 
data about the present state and theoretical calculations on the basis of a valid theory. In clas-
sical physics we had the singular situation that we could predict e.g. the positions of a planet, 
in principle, with certainty. This was, however, very principle-like; it applied mainly to the 
standard case of the movement of a planet. Even there, it is generally impossible to know the 
present situation and all influences on it exactly enough to predict with certainty. Thus, in the 
“classical” situation probabilities come in as well, not different from quantum theory. But 
still, in the foundations there is that decisive difference between a deterministic and an inde-
terministic theory: in a deterministic, “classical” theory we can always suppose that in fact 
every observable has an exact value.
When quantum theory was discovered, it was not clear from the beginning that indeterminism 
was its key feature. It was only after many futile attempts that Max Born published his semi-
nal paper (1926)7 . There he says that the square of the coefficient in the decomposition of the 
wave function is the probability of finding the corresponding result. Born continues his con-
siderations with the suggestion that quantum theory is fundamentally indeterministic.
Among the “Copenhagen” experts, there had been speculations about indeterminism for some 
time before but most of them hesitated publishing their opinion because of the strong impact 
that such a change must have on our picture of the world. Thus Born was the first one who 
dared publishing that consequence of their discussions.
3 Indeterminism
In fact, indeterminism is the revolutionary new property of quantum theory, compared with 
all other physical theories. Indeterminism is the one property of quantum theory that is, to my 
mind, the real reason for the difficulties felt with understanding that theory.
Now, indeterminism does not mean that there is no way of predicting anything about the re-
sult of future measurements. Instead of predictions with certainty we have, in an indeterminis-
tic theory, predictions with probability. As a consequence, many difficulties felt with quan-
tum theory can be reduced to problems of probability. Thus, our first question is now, what is 
probability?
4 Probability8
The probability of a result, as used in empirical science, has to do with the relative frequency 
of that result in a series of measurements. Many physicists simply identify probability with 
relative frequency. But that does not work: Imagine throwing a coin, with probability of heads 
and tails both being ½. Now flip that coin 13 times. The relative frequency ½ would mean 6.5 
results heads. That is not possible! – But there is still another objection that goes deeper: Us-
ing probability calculus we can calculate—we shall deal with that later—probabilities on a 
7  Max Born, ‘Zur Quantenmechanik der Stoßvorgänge.’ Zeitschrift f. Physik 37, 863–867. here p. 865
8 https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/probability-interpret/
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higher level. Consider, as an example, a series of 12 tosses of dice, and repeat that series 
many times. The probability, e.g., with a “good” die to get a ‘four’ is 1/6. From probability 
calculus we can calculate the probability that exactly 1/6 of the 12, i.e. 2 throws will show a 
‘four’. The formula for the probability p(n) of a number of n results ‘four’ in the sequence of 
12 throws (n = 0, …, 12) is:
The following table gives values p(n): n | p(n)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 …
→     n
  
This gives p(2) = 29.6%, but the probability to get only one “four” is not much less, namely 
p(1) = 26.9%, and, just giving a few more examples, p(3) = 19.7%, p(0) = 11.2%, and p(12) = 
5∙10-10. That means: All relative frequencies, not only 1/6, have positive probability, i.e. they 
are possible, and relative frequencies unequal but near the value of the probability are almost 
as probable as those exactly equal to the probability. Thus, probability theory itself excludes 
the identification of probability with relative frequency. We will come back later to such con-
siderations.
Predictions
It can be shown that “predicted relative frequency” is a good definition of probability. From 
this definition even the rules of probability calculus can be deduced.9 
5 The Necessity of Classical Concepts
There is a great problem with an indeterministic theory one would not think of in the begin-
ning: How can we use such a theory for describing reality? – Quantum mechanics gives pre-
dictions of the form: “When quantity Q is measured then one will find the value q1 with prob-
ability p(q1).” But that gives no possibility for describing reality, quantum mechanics does not 
give a picture of a reality “out there”! This difference between quantum mechanics and classi-
cal physics seems to be the reason of the uneasiness some people felt immediately after the 
discovery of quantum mechanics, and some still feel uneasy today. 
There is one area where that lack is especially felt, namely in the description of measure-
ments. Niels Bohr remarked that we have to be able to say “…what we have done and what 
we have learnt.” His conclusion for quantum mechanics is that classical concepts are neces-
sary for a description of measurements. In classical theory it is presupposed that descriptions 
9  cf. Michael Drieschner, Found. Phys. 46(2016)28–43
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like “The present apparatus measures quantity Q”, or “The measured value is q1” make sense. 
Since within the framework of quantum mechanics such descriptions of reality do not occur, 
we have to take the aid of classical physics in order to be able to give such descriptions. But 
there we have a problem: According to quantum mechanics classical physics is outdated; 
wherever quantum mechanics and classical physics give different results, quantum mechanics 
is right, classical physics is wrong. – This sounds awful, but actually there is no reason for 
worrying, because really in the usual cases quantum mechanics gives almost the same results 
as classical physics. A working physicist, in any case, would not consider that a catastrophe 
since in physics, as mentioned above, we rarely have exact values at all. Still, many philoso-
phers of science, who traditionally come from logic or mathematics, would insist that “almost 
correct” is, in fact, false. But in physics that argument is not valid. Approximation lies at the 
foundation of physics; without approximation physics is not possible at all. Maybe the most 
important argument is: Physics deals with objects which are defined by the observables that 
can be measured on those objects. Take, e.g., a classical point mass, which is defined as an 
object the state of which at a certain instant can be described completely by its position and 
momentum. There are no things in the world that are point masses. In order to describe any-
thing as a point mass we use approximations: We discard every information except about po-
sition and momentum; we treat the mass of the body concerned as concentrated in one point 
in space; we give the results of our measurements real number values—all of which do not 
depict reality as it is but in a certain approximation. Without that we could not do physics.
It is actually quite normal to accept a proposition being ‘approximately true’ as a true pro-
position. Thus in physics there is no problem in accepting a “classical” proposition within the 
framework of quantum mechanics. And more than that: quantum mechanics is incomplete 
without those parts of classical physics; it could not be linked to reality without.
6 Interpretations10
In the course of almost 100 years of discussions about quantum theory, so many interpreta-
tions have been proposed that I will not endeavor giving a survey, and much less giving a sys-
tematic account of that abundance. My purpose here is rather to give some examples that may 
make my description clearer. Therefore, I will give short comments on three very different in-
terpretations, namely
 the “Bohmian mechanics” introduced by David Bohm in 195211;
 the “many-worlds” interpretation introduced by Everett, Wheeler, and DeWitt from 
1957 on12; 
 and last, but not least, the “Minimal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” I will 
present here.
I did not mention the “Copenhagen Interpretation”. Since it is universally acknowledged that 
it is difficult to get a clear cut definition of what that interpretation is, I rather do not attempt 
10 cf. Lewis, Peter J., “Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
11 Bohm, David: Phys.Rev. 85 (1952) 166,180; reprinted in: Wheeler, J.A. and Zurek, W.H. (eds.): Quantum 
Theory and Measurement. Princeton, NJ (UP) 1983. There is a very well informed and thorough account in: 
Passon, Oliver, Bohmsche Mechanik. Frankfurt/M (Harri Deutsch) 2004. (there is no English translation).
12 DeWitt, Bryce S.; Graham, R. Neill (eds.): The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Prince-
ton University Press, 1973.
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to give one. Possibly the “Minimal Interpretation” presented here comes close to what is usu-
ally called the Copenhagen Interpretation.
Minimal Interpretation
In March 2000 there was in the journal ‘Physics Today’ an article “Quantum Theory needs no 
‘interpretation’” which stated, among others: “The thread common to all the non-standard 
“interpretations” is the desire to create a new theory with features that correspond to some re-
ality independent of our potential experiments. But, trying to fulfill a classical worldview by 
encumbering quantum mechanics with hidden variables, multiple worlds, consistency rules, 
or spontaneous collapse, without any improvement in its predictive power, only gives the illu-
sion of a better understanding. Contrary to those desires, quantum theory does not describe 
physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the 
macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of our experimental inter-
ventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only interpretation ever 
needed, whether by experimenters or theorists.”13
Our concept of ‘Minimal Interpretation’ appears, as well, in a modern overview book14. 
The authors (in this case, Cord Friebe) state:”If one tries to proceed systematically, then it is 
expedient to begin with an interpretation upon which everyone can agree, that is with an in-
strumentalist minimal interpretation. In such an interpretation, Hermitian operators represent 
macroscopic measurement apparatus, and their eigenvalues indicate the measurement out-
comes  (pointer positions) which can be observed, while inner products give the probabilities 
of obtaining particular measured values. With such a formulation, quantum mechanics re-
mains stuck in the macroscopic world and avoids any sort of ontological statement about the 
(microscopic) quantum-physical system itself.” Thus, we have here the contrary of the none-
interpretation mentioned above. They continue their account with: “Going one step further, 
we come to the ensemble interpretation: Here, the mathematical symbols indeed refer to mi-
croscopic objects, but only to a very large number of such systems. According to this view, 
quantum mechanics is a kind of statistical theory whose laws are those of large numbers. In 
regard to a particular system, this interpretation remains agnostic.” – It is interesting that in 
this last interpretation probability is introduced as “laws of large numbers”. This is a very spe-
cial interpretation of probability and does not directly concern quantum mechanics at all. 
Friebe et al. do not seem to be satisfied with the “minimal interpretation” described above. 
They state (p. 44):”The fact that this minimal interpretation makes statements only about 
macroscopic, empirically directly accessible entities such as measurement setups, particle 
tracks in detectors or pulses from a microchannel plate may be quite adequate for those who 
see the goal of the theory within an experimental science such as physics as being simply the
ability to provide empirically testable predictions. For the metaphysics of science, this is not 
sufficient, and most physicists would also prefer to have some idea of what is behind those 
measurements and observational data, i.e. just how the microscopic world which produces 
such effects is really structured.” Continuing, they are certainly right in suspecting: “In con-
trast to the instrumentalist minimal interpretation, however, every additional assumption 
which might lead to a further-reaching interpretation remains controversial.”
13  Fuchs, Christopher A.; Asher Peres: “Quantum Theory needs no ‘interpretation’”. Physics Today, March 
2000, p. 70-71; here p.70
14  Friebe (2018)
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Here you find the decisive keys: “what is behind?” and “how the microscopic world […]is 
really structured.” Those who ask these questions apparently presuppose that there is some-
thing behind, that there is a microscopic world that is really structured somehow. But, how 
do they know? Is there some necessity for such presuppositions? – To my mind it is just our 
being accustomed to the classical ontology, as I called it above, that leads us to believing that. 
Actually quantum mechanics seems rather to show that such questions lead nowhere. We 
shall see in the discussion further on that the alleged solutions of this task offer nothing but an 
additions of words to the well-known theory—one should rather do without.
There is, though, a good sense in attributing properties to objects of quantum mechanics: If 
it is possible to predict with certainty the outcome xo for a measurement of the quantity X on 
object15 O, we can say (as a kind of abbreviation) “The object O has property xo”.
What we called here “Minimal Interpretation” is a kind of replacement for the rather foggy 
picture we have of the Copenhagen interpretation. This “Minimal Interpretation” is what I 
think I can understand and justify as a convincing interpretation of quantum mechanics, and 
in some way it resembles Copenhagen interpretations.
7 Mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics
For the further discussion, let us start from the mathematical formalism: In quantum mechan-
ics a physical object is described with the help of a complex vector space with an inner prod-
uct (”Hilbert space”). How is physics connected with that space? – The observables of the ob-
ject described are represented by self-adjoint operators of the Hilbert space. An eigenvalue x0  
of a self-adjoint operator X represents a possible result of a measurements of the correspond-
ing observable X. The present state of the object is described by a vector of norm 1 in the vec-
tor space (more abstractly, it is described by the eigenspace of the said eigenvalue; if the 
eigenspace is one-dimensional, it is conventionally represented by a vector in it of norm one. 
Still more generally, the state of the system is represented by a “statistical operator”). The 
eigenvector ξ0 corresponding (in the special case mentioned) to the eigenvalue x0  represents 
the state of the system after the eigenvalue x0  has been measured. If the state of the system be-
fore the measurement is correctly described by the state-vector ξ (of norm 1) then the proba-
bility of measuring value x0 is the square of the absolute value of the inner product of the two 
vectors, 
p(x0) = |(ξ,ξ0)|2,
provided (ξ0,ξ0) = (ξ,ξ) = 1 (ignoring for the time being a more general description). 
The time development of the state ξ of the system is described by a unitary transformation de-
pending on to the elapsed time t, 
ξ (t )=e
−i
ħ
⋅H⋅t
⋅ξ (0 )
where H is the Hamiltonian Operator, which represents the observable ‘energy’. 
8 Lattice
The above presentation describes quantum mechanics as students learn it. It leads to some 
specific difficulties, though, for understanding quantum mechanics. One could, e.g., ask what 
15  We treat the terms ‘object’ and ‘system’ as synonyms
8/18
the addition of vectors of Hilbert space means in reality—since it occurs in the mathematical 
description that is supposed to represent a corresponding structure of reality. But asking such 
a question does not make sense: ‘addition of vectors in Hilbert space’ does not have a mean-
ing in a description of reality. This is important to know for an interpretation: The topic of ad-
mitting questions arises only from a formulation of quantum mechanics that does not easily 
lend itself for an understanding, namely in so far as it uses the vector space formalism. 
This drawback might be cured by a more abstract but more comprehensible mathematical 
picture in using the concept of lattice: 
A mathematical lattice is a partially ordered set (with an ordering we signify by ‘≼’) which 
is closed under meet (∩) and join (∪), where meet, in this general context,  is the greatest 
lower bound according to the order relation ‘≼’, and join is the least upper bound. A lattice 
contains the elements ∅ and 1, the minimal and maximal elements of the whole structure, ac-
cording to the order relation ‘≼’. A special example of a lattice is the set of all subsets of a 
given set, ordered by set inclusion (⊆)—isomorphic with the lattice of (classical) proposi-
tional logic. This type of lattice is called Boolean. But the concept of lattice is much more 
general.
Let us be more specific for our case of quantum mechanics: A lattice is orthocomplemented 
iff for every element E of the lattice there is an orthocomplement, namely an element E┴ such 
that 
 E∩E┴ = ∅;
 E∪E┴ = 1;
 E┴┴ =  E;
 if E≼F then F┴≼E┴.
Again, the set of subsets of a given set, ordered by set inclusion (⊆), is a special example, 
where the orthocomplement is the ordinary set complement. An example that is important for 
quantum mechanics is the set of all subspaces of Hilbert space. It is ordered by set inclusion, 
the orthocomplement of a subspace is the orthogonal subspace.
Let us now consider the structure of all properties of a given physical system or, maybe 
more realistic, the structure of all possible results of measurements of that system! The order-
ing relation in that case is implication (‘→’): A→B means: ‘Whenever A is necessary then B 
is necessary as well’. The other properties of the orthocomplemented lattice are the the fol-
lowing: the orthocomplement is negation (‘not’, ¬); the ‘meet’ operator represents conjunc-
tion (‘and’, ∧)—nothing but putting two predictions beside each other. From there, disjunc-
tion (‘or’, ∨) can be derived as:
A∨B = (A┴∧B┴)┴.
It can easily be seen from the definition of the orthocomplement that A∧B is the greatest 
lower bound, and A∨B is the least upper bound of A and B.
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Again, classical propositional logic is an example, as well as the lattice of subspaces of 
Hilbert space. Because evidently there are similarities between the two, the lattice of the sub-
spaces of a Hilbert space sometimes is called “Quantum Logic”16. 
Considering quantum mechanics from the lattice point of view gives us the means at hand 
that make it easier to understand quantum mechanics—without being obliged to dive into the 
depths of differential analysis or the like. All we have to do is fixing a few fundamentals of 
what we understand physics to be.
9 Physical objects (“systems”)
The first question: What is physics about? – One possible answer is: “Physics gives the op-
portunity for predictions, based on the present state and using established theories.” – This an-
swer is felt by some scholars as being too “operational.”17 They are rather seeking an objec-
tive description of reality. But these two goals of physics are not as far apart as it might seem. 
What is an ‘objective’ description? It is one that is valid independently of the person, time 
and place; it can be verified—in principle—by anyone anytime anywhere. ‘Verifying’ means, 
checking whether the respective proposition is true. This kind of checking is possible only if 
the proposition is a prediction which can come true or not. Thus, any objective description 
necessarily involves predictions. 
Thus, we can record that physics deals with objective predictions. – How are such predic-
tions connected among each other? – Actually, as mentioned above, the predictions do not 
concern the real world but an approximate, idealized “model”, the physical system. It is de-
fined by its observables. Here the fundamental role of predictions comes into play: A physical 
system is composed of those observables that make, together, predictions about the same ob-
servables possible. Take, e.g., the classical object ‘point mass’. Its defining observables are 
position and momentum. Momentum governs the change of position, and how momentum 
will change (i.e. the forces on the point mass) depends in many cases only on the position 
and, maybe in addition, on momentum (as for friction). Thus, for many cases position and 
momentum are a good choice of observables for a system to enable predictions about those 
same observables. Therefore, a point mass is a good object in such cases. – Let us have a look 
at a more complex example, the electromagnetic field, defined by its values at every point in 
space: The Maxwell equations show that the change of the magnetic field depends on spatial 
derivatives of the electric field, and the change of the electric field depends on spatial deriva-
tives of the magnetic field; thus, again, the whole set enables predictions for the same whole 
set. 
But what about quantum mechanics? 
Quantum mechanical predictions are similar to classical ones: They predict outcomes of 
measurements. All possible outcomes of one measurement form a Boolean lattice, as in clas-
sical physics. But, other than in classical physics, in quantum mechanics there are incom-
patible observables. That means, if the state of the system can be described by the necessity of 
a certain outcome (i.e. in attributing the corresponding property—e.g. a certain position—to 
16  Cf. The paper ‘The Logic of Quantum Mechanics” of 1936 by G. Birkhoff and J.v.Neuman, Annals of Math-
ematics, 37(1936)(4): 823–843. doi:10.2307/1968621
17  cf. the quotation from Friebe (2018) on p. 6
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the system), then there are possible outcomes of other measurements—e.g. of momentum— 
that cannot be predicted with certainty, but only with certain probabilities: Such observables 
are called incompatible. “Almost all” pairs of observables of a system are incompatible. 
So there we are, at the notorious indeterminism of quantum mechanics. Whereas in classi-
cal physics we could always suppose that there is one Boolean lattice that comprises all possi-
ble predictions about a system, in quantum mechanics there are several Boolean lattices for 
different incompatible observables. The question therefore is, how those Boolean lattices 
combine into a description of the respective system. In the completed quantum mechanics, to 
be sure, the combination is described as the orthocomplemented lattice of the closed sub-
spaces of Hilbert space. That is known, in principle, empirically. But can we get at under-
standing that structure without jumping at once to the conclusion “Hilbert space”?
10 Are there alternatives to quantum mechanics?
What do we know about that combination lattice, from general consideration? –
1. There are Boolean sublattices, one for every set of compatible observables.
2. It is an orthocomplemented lattice.
3. There are probability functions defined for any Boolean sublattice of the whole lattice.
4. If there is a necessary prediction that defines the present state of the system, it defines 
probabilities for all predictions.
5. We can compose two independent systems abstractly into one system. The probability of 
finding a joint result is the product of the two probabilities involved.
Can we conclude from general considerations more specifically what the quantum mechanical 
lattice is like? – In the completed quantum mechanics the lattice we use is, abstractly speak-
ing, a complex projective geometry. This is, in more abstract terms, what is represented by the 
lattice of the closed subspaces of Hilbert space.
Finding that lattice from plausible assumptions would be the decisive step in the foundation 
of quantum mechanics. The ‘Plato’ database at Stanford18 says, in referring to this lattice as 
‘L(H)’: “The point to bear in mind is that, once the quantum-logical skeleton L(H) is in 
place, the remaining statistical and dynamical apparatus of quantum mechanics is essentially 
fixed. In this sense, then, quantum mechanics—or, at any rate, its mathematical framework—
reduces to quantum logic and its attendant probability theory.”
Varadarajan says in his seminal book,19 “For a long time it has been a desire within the com-
munity for finding rather comprehensible postulates that imply the structure of quantum me-
chanics.”  Varadarajan was one of those scholars who contributed a lot to meet that desire. 
There has been, though, no mathematical proof so far that Hilbert space is the only possibility 
for a structure of quantum mechanics. But, up to now, no other lattice has been found that 
complies with the rules mentioned. 
One property that makes this lattice special is its behavior when two systems are composed. 
When you take one observable of each of the systems, the compound observable is the direct 
product of the two separate ones. All those direct products form again a lattice of the same 
18  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/; chapter 1.4
19   Varadarajan, V. S., Geometry of Quantum Theory, New York (Springer) 1985
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type as the component ones, in this case describing the compound system.—In quantum me-
chanics we describe the state space of the compound system as the tensor product of the two 
state spaces. This seems to be a very special combination, because it comprises the direct 
product of any two observables of the two component systems, and they again form an ortho-
complemented lattice of the same type as the component ones, though, naturally, its dimen-
sion is the product of the dimensions of the components. I suspect that this special structure 
gives a handle for justifying the structure of quantum mechanics.
Starting from this structure (the orthocomplemented complex projective geometry), we can 
introduce the usual quantum mechanics of the ψ-function etc. as a special representation of 
that structure, which facilitates calculating measurable results. 
Taking quantum mechanics as a lattice of possible predictions, seems to make it easier to un-
derstand. Let me take up, in order to try that out, some of the much discussed stumbling 
blocks within quantum mechanics.
11 Stumbling blocks in quantum mechanics
Twofold dynamics
In classical mechanics, dynamics consists of one law for the time development that governs 
all changes of the respective system. Not so in quantum mechanics: Here, two entirely inde-
pendent ways of change of state exist. One way is the change according to the Schrödinger 
equation, the other is the “collapse of the wave function” by a measurement. 
The first way of change is quite similar to the change of a field in classical physics, controlled 
by an field equation. The other (the “collapse”) is specifically quantum.20 That this latter 
change of state occurs, is a consequence of the quantum mechanical indeterminism: Because 
of indeterminism it is impossible to predict the outcome of a measurement; there can be no 
dynamical law that controls that outcome. Any measurement thus implies a surprise for the 
one who measures, but the state after the measurement is defined by the result of that mea-
surement – hence that jump of the state, the “collapse”. Thus, it seems inevitable in an inde-
terministic theory to have two quite independent dynamics.
There have been and still are attempts at unifying the dynamics of quantum mechanics. But 
such attempts can only be undertaken on the grounds of a misinterpretation of indeterminism. 
A truly indeterministic theory must necessarily comprise the two ways of change of state de-
scribed above.
Action at a Distance (EPR)
The “collapse of the wave function” by a measurement instantly changes the wave function in 
all of space. This change of  state looks like an action at a distance—which is physically im-
possible. But in the case of an indeterministic theory, a change of the probabilities is nothing 
but a change of the expectations we have, not a change in the objects we describe; and those 
20 cf. Chapter VI.1 in: Johann von Neumann, Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, Springer, Ber-
lin (1932); English version: John von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1955)
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can be applicable to as far distant events as one likes: They do not change the reality at any 
distance!
A special, more complex case is the conservation of certain quantities in two separate objects
—treated usually under the catchword of “EPR”. That acronym refers to a paper by Einstein 
and two of his collaborators, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, about the question of the 
“completeness” of quantum mechanics21. They start with the definition: “If, without in any 
way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i. e. , with probability equal to unity) 
the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding 
to this physical quantity.” They illustrate their point with an example of measurements of po-
sition and momentum; we prefer the example introduced by David Bohm with measurements 
of  the spin components of a spin ½ particle22: Imagine a certain particle with spin = 0 that de-
cays into two particles with spin ½ each. Conservation of angular momentum requires that the 
spins of the two resulting particles are in opposite directions. Thus, I can measure the spin 
component of one of the particles and infer from the result the spin component of the other, 
maybe very distant one. From their principle quoted above, EPR conclude that the spin com-
ponent of the distant particle is an element of reality. The point that makes this conclusion 
very amazing is that in the quantum mechanical case, the experimenter can decide about the 
direction of the instrument he measures the spin component with, such that he seems to be 
able to control an element of reality that might even be light years distant from him. Is that a 
case of the notorious “spukhafte Fernwirkung” Einstein condemned in a letter to his friend 
Max Born?23 I think EPR is another case of the same structure as the “collapse” mentioned 
above. For an explanation, let us have a look on what really happens in the kind of correlation 
measurements described.
What happens there in the real world? – We call the two experimenters who measure the 
spin components on both sides, Alice and Bob, as usual. Suppose Alice measured the spin of 
her particle with her apparatus oriented vertically and found spin "up". What is the effect of 
her result on Bob's side? - Bob will see a random sequence of ups and downs (in whichever 
orientation his apparatus is) with about 50 % of each kind. And that is the important observa-
tion: He does not see any effect of what Alice is doing or finding on her side. Actually, there 
is no "spooky action at a distance", there is no action at a distance, there is even no action at 
all!
So we have to ask again what it means that the state of the far particle is changed instantly. 
The answer is analogous to the one given for the "collapse": It means that Bob can construct 
out of his events a statistical ensemble that represents a certain state if he uses the information 
about Alice's results. If Bob gets the spin result of every single measurement Alice made, then 
he will find e.g., if his apparatus is oriented vertically as Alice's, comparing Alice's results 
with his own one by one, that the two results are always opposite. He could filter the se-
quence of results according to Alice's findings; he could take e.g. all events with spin "up" on 
Alice's side. In that way he would prepare a new ensemble on his own side corresponding to a 
21  Einstein, Albert, B. Podolsky, N. Rosen. Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Con-
sidered Complete? Phys. Rev. 47(1935) 777.
22  Bohm, D., 1951, Quantum Theory, New York: Prentice Hall.
23  In the letter to Born no. 84 of March 3, 1947. in: Albert Einstein - Max Born. Briefwechsel 1916-1955. Mün-
chen 1969, p. 210; English translation: The Born Einstein Letters. Translated by Irene Born. London 1971, p. 
158. In the translation that quote appears as "spooky action at a distance". Commentators do not agree as to 
whether that is a good translation. Considering German usage, the quote in German means in English some-
thing like "mysterious action at a distance, as done by ghosts".
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state with spin "down". He can do that if he uses the information about the exact sequence of 
results on Alice's side. That selection really defines a quantum mechanical state: Even if Bob 
uses his apparatus in a different orientation for the measurements on his side, the frequency of 
results he finds corresponds to the probability he could have calculated for the quantum me-
chanical state "down" on his side.
Thus, it is true that the state of the system at Bob's side depends on the results of Alice's 
measurements. But Bob can find out anything about that state only if he uses the sequence of 
Alice's results. He must have gotten those results from another source – maybe from an email 
by Alice. Thus, the change of state by the supposed "spooky action at a distance" is actually 
not a physical process at all but rather a process of bookkeeping that takes place after the 
measurements.
This is a way we can understand the rather enigmatic description saying that Bob's state 
changes instantly but that this change cannot be used to transmit information. Actually noth-
ing changes at Bob's side at all. It is only a later bookkeeping that can give us an opportunity 
to check the statistical predictions which follow from the state change.
Sometimes it is maintained that the Bell inequalities24 imply action at a distance in quantum 
mechanics. But this is not so. What the Bell inequalities say is: In a local hidden variable the-
ory some probability distributions of quantum mechanics cannot be reproduced. If someone 
believes in hidden variable theories, he is forced to introduce action at a distance. But that de-
pends on his belief in hidden variable theories. I should rather conclude that a hidden variable 
theory of quantum mechanics is not possible, since locality is of fundamental importance for 
physics.
There is another issue that has been discussed a lot during those 100 years of quantum me-
chanics:
Theory of Measurement
There has always been some interest in the quantum mechanical theory of measurement—
much more than in the case of classical theories. This is perhaps mainly due to the fact that 
the things quantum mechanics usually deals with are visible only indirectly; one needs some 
measurement apparatus in order to know anything about those things. Another, deeper, reason 
is the fact already mentioned that quantum mechanics does not allow a direct conclusion on 
the properties of the objects in question but rather only probabilities of finding certain results. 
Thus, the question arises how theoretical results are connected with “real” findings. The the-
ory of quantum mechanical measurement is supposed to provide the bridge between the the-
ory and the findings. 
In the course of the development of quantum mechanics there has been so much discussion 
about measurement that I cannot even give a survey. I will deal shortly with one problem only 
that is often referred to as the central problem of the theory of measurement. This needs some 
introductory remarks:
Let us describe the simplest form of a measurement: We start with an observable, say X, 
that is to be measured on a system S. The n possible results of the measurement are x1,…, xn. 
24  Bell, J. S.: 1964. On the Einstein Podolski Rosen Paradox. Physics l, 195; Reprinted in: Bell, J. S.: 1987. 
Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge (UP)
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For the measurement we use a measuring apparatus A with n possible readings (say, on a 
scale) a1,…, an corresponding to the n possible results of the measurement. Before the mea-
surement, S and A are separated, A is in some pre-measurement, state. Then the measurement 
interaction takes place; as a result of that interaction, A shows the reading, say, ak, which 
means that S is in the state xk. 
Now we try describing the interaction in quantum mechanical detail: The originally sepa-
rated objects S and A interact, i.e. they must be described as one compound object, name it 
S&A. This object is transformed according to the Schrödinger equation. In the resulting state 
there are no more separate objects but there is the compound object S&A only, in a new state. 
Unfortunately this is not what we expected from the measurement; we rather went into all the 
trouble of measuring in order to end up with a clear cut result ai. 
Let us then regard the process of measurement from its expected end: We expect as the re-
sult of a measurement one of the readings ai on the apparatus A. Since we cannot say before-
hand which of the ai will come out, we describe the expected resulting state as a 
mixture of all possible results,weighted with their probability: where pi is the prob-
ability of the result xi. – This second description contains noth- ing but the state of 
the system, the apparatus is somehow eliminated. How can we describe the transition of the 
result of the Schrödinger transformation described above into this last state of the apparatus? 
– That is the core of the most discussed problem of the quantum mechanical theory of mea-
surement!
What is the status of that strange “mixture”? – Already John von Neumann, in his book of 
193225, jumps quickly, just by “that is”, from the single measurement to the statistical mix-
ture. He writes, after describing the "causal" change of state according to the Schrödinger 
equation: "On the other hand the state φ—which may refer to a quantity with a pure dis-
crete spectrum, distinct eigenvalues and eigenfunctions φ1, φ2 …— undergoes in a measure-
ment a change in which any of the states φ1, φ2, … may result, and in fact do result with the 
respective probabilities 
|(φ,φ1)|2, |(φ,φ2)|2,… . That is the mixture  obtains. […] Since the 
states go over into mixtures, the process is not causal."26 
Thus, without further comment, just by "That is", von Neumann jumps directly from the 
single result of a measurement to the weighted mixture of all possible results. So, for John 
von Neumann this change is the transition from the state before the measurement to the mix-
ture after the measurement, and, as far as I can see, all later discussions of the process of mea-
surement do the same. 
The problem is that the measuring process is described from two different points of view: 
1. The dynamics of the measurement interaction results in a pure state of the compound 
system.
25  von Neumann (1932/1955/2018): Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, by John von 
Neumann. German original 1932, translated from the German 1955 by Robert T. Beyer, New Edition 
2018 edited by Nicholas A. Wheeler. Princeton (UP) 2018, p. 417–418
26  von Neumann John (1955/2018), p 271
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2. The description of the expected result of the measurement is a statistical mixture of 
the possible results, weighted with their probabilities.
The transition from the pure state (1) to the mixture (2) can be described as the “disappear-
ance of the interference terms” of the state. There have been many attempts at finding a quan-
tum mechanical process that would accomplish that change. Peter Mittelstaedt, e.g., spent 
most of his academic life with such attempts. Towards the end of his life he seems to have 
given up hope of finding a solution. – Even a rather new account of the measurement prob-
lem27 gives exactly the the same representation of the problem as John von Neumann in 1932.
My impression is, on the other hand, that such a process is not necessary28. It is rather that 
you have to make up your mind on what you are talking about: 
One might talk about a beam of particles passing through a device that sorts the  particles 
according to the eigenvalues of the observable to be measured. There we arrive at a mixture, 
either of a collection of empirical results with there frequencies or, within the theory, a collec-
tion of all possible results with the respective probabilities: it is a formal collection of all (real 
or possible) results of the measurement into a statistical ensemble. But this ensemble is the re-
sult of a bookkeeping process. It is an ensemble of ‘classical’ results; quantum mechanics 
must not be applied to them, so there can be no question of interference terms from the begin-
ning.
On the the other hand one might talk about a single measurement. In one real experiment 
there is only one result (albeit unpredictable, as a consequence of indeterminism). Thus, 
again, there is no question of interference terms. 
Realism
Realism in quantum mechanics is a subject that has been intensely discussed. This is quite 
understandable since one of the characteristic features of quantum mechanics is that it does 
not give a picture of reality, like classical physics does. It gives rules for predictions on mea-
surements instead. So, many physicists tried to give quantum mechanics a “realistic” interpre-
tation, i.e. an interpretation that describes a reality “out there” that is independent of being 
measured or even perceived at all. Advocates of a realistic view seem to consider it self-evi-
dent that there must be some reality “behind” the phenomena described by quantum mechan-
ics29. There is, e.g., a paper by Tim Maudlin30 where the author tries to analyze the problem of 
quantum mechanical measurement. In the beginning he states three inconsistent claims. I 
quote:
“The following three claims are mutually inconsistent:
1.A The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e. the wave-function specifies (directly 
or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system.
27  Holger Lyre. Why Quantum Theory is Possibly Wrong. Found Phys 40(2010)1429–1438
28 Michael Drieschner, A Note on the Quantum Mechanical Measurement Process. 
philosophia naturalis 50(2013)201–213
29  cf. p. 6 above
30  Tim Maudlin, Three Measurement Problems. Topoi 14(1995)7-15
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1.B The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation (e.g. 
the Schrödinger equation).
1.C Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron always (or at least usually) have de-
terminate outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measurement the measuring device is 
either in a state which indicates spin up (and not down) or spin down (and not up).”
It is already statement 1.A that does not really fit quantum mechanics: The wave function 
never specifies physical properties of a system; this would presuppose some kind of “classi-
cal” understanding. What the wave function (or, more generally, the quantum mechanical 
state) specifies is a catalog of probabilities for all possible results of experiments on the sys-
tem. Thus, 1.A can never be true, independently of the other claims. 
1.B is not quantum mechanical either: As quoted above, John von Neumann stated already in 
his (1932) that there are two ways the quantum mechanical state changes in time according to 
quantum mechanics, namely either according to the Schrödinger equation or by a “collapse” 
after a measurement. – cf. the discussion above.
We see that Maudlin’s text is biased in favor of some “realistic” world view that is not appli-
cable in quantum mechanics.
.1 Bohm
A well-known example of realism, and probably the oldest one, is David Bohm’s  theory, first 
published in 195231. Bohm says there that he reformulated quantum mechanics as a basis for 
his attempt at extending quantum mechanics in order to get a “realistic” theory. His reformu-
lation suggested a similarity with Hamilton-Jacoby theories of classical mechanics. But in 
fact it was nothing but quantum mechanics in a formalism a bit unusual. In those about 70 
years since, nobody succeeded really extending quantum mechanics in a way Bohm probably 
had in mind. But “Bohmian Mechanics” adds to quantum mechanics a way of speaking about 
nature that were not possible if one regarded nothing but measurable quantities and feasible 
experiments. In Bohmian Mechanics there are, e.g., trajectories of particles; trajectories do 
not exist in quantum mechanics. Even according to “Bohmians” those trajectories are princi-
pally not visible or measurable. In fact, they are nothing but words, added to quantum me-
chanics. Besides, particles, according to the Bohmian way of talking, would have speeds 
faster than light, sometimes they would even have infinite velocity. Bohmians say that this 
does not matter because they can never be observed anyway. 
There is an excellent thorough representation of Bohmian Mechanics by a true Bohmian, 
Oliver Passon.32
31  Bohm, D.: ‘A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of “Hidden” Vari-
ables.’Phys. Rev. 85(1952)166,180; reprinted in: Wheeler, J.A. und Zurek, W.H. (eds.): Quantum 
Theory and Measurement. Princeton, NJ (UP) 1983
32  Passon, Oliver. Bohmsche Mechanik: Eine elementare Einführung in die deterministische Interpre-
tation der Quantenmechanik. Harri Deutsch, Frankfurt, 2004, ISBN 978-3-8171-1742-0. – There 
exists no English translation. 
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.2 Many Worlds
An other attempt at “improving” quantum mechanics, which is as well known as Bohmian 
Mechanics, is the “Many Worlds” interpretation by Everett, Wheeler, and DeWitt33. I must 
confess that I do not understand why this interpretation shows up in many discussions as an 
alternative to the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is again, looked at closely 
enough, neither an alternative theory nor an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
It is, basically, nothing but a change of language: The usual description of quantum mechan-
ics talks of a set of possibilities (for a measurement outcome), one of which becomes real in 
the measurement, the others don’t. What is usually called the Everett-Interpretation says, on 
the other hand, that all possibilities become real. In order to make that possible, the Ev-
erettism says that the universe splits up into as many universes as there are possible outcomes, 
and every possible outcome becomes real in one of those universes. What does that mean? – I 
cannot find any rational interpretation of that story. Let us try to translate the Everettish lan-
guage back to ordinary English: Instead of talking of “other universes” one could just as well 
talk about “possibilities not realized”—this would not change anything at all. Thus, what re-
mains of the “Everett-interpretation” is only an unusual wording that is easily re-translatable, 
though, into ordinary language.
12 Conclusion
It is not so hard to understand quantum mechanics, once one has accepted its indeterministic 
character (and uses the lattice representation). Understanding the underlying concept of prob-
ability is much easier if one starts from the definition: probability is predicted relative fre-
quency. Thus, Fuchs and Peres couldn’t be more right: Quantum Theory needs no ‘interpreta-
tion’!
■
33  Everett, H.: 1957. “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454; 
Wheeler, J.A.:1957: Assessment of Everett's "Relative State" Formulation of Quantum Theory. 
Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 463; DeWitt, Bryce: 1970: Quantum mechanics and Reality. Physics Today 
Sept. 1970, 30-35.
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Quotation from: Friebe et al 2018, p. 39
If one tries to proceed systematically, then it is expedient to begin with an interpretation upon 
which everyone can agree, that is with an instrumentalist minimal interpretation. In such an inter-
pretation, Hermitian operators represent macroscopic measurement apparatus, and their eigen-
values indicate the measurement outcomes (pointer positions) which can be observed, while in-
ner products give the probabilities of obtaining particular measured values. With such a formula-
tion, quantum mechanics remains stuck in the macroscopic world and avoids any sort of onto-
logical statement about the (microscopic) quantum-physical system itself.
(Friebe (2018), p.44)
2.2 The Ensemble Interpretation and the Copenhagen Interpretation
The first stage of interpretation of the mathematical formalism establishes the connection to the empirical 
world as far as needed for everyday physics in the laboratory or at the particle collider. Born’s rule allows a 
precise prediction of the probabilities of observing particular outcomes in real, macroscopic measure-
ments. The fact that this minimal interpretation makes statements only about macroscopic, empirically di-
rectly accessible entities such as measurement setups, particle tracks in detectors or pulses from a mi-
crochannel plate may be quite adequate for those who see the goal of the theory within an experimental 
science such as physics as being simply the ability to provide empirically testable predictions. For the 
metaphysics of science, this is not sufficient, and most physicists would also prefer to have some idea of 
what is behind those measurements and observational data, i.e. just how the microscopic world which 
produces such effects is really structured. In contrast to the instrumentalist minimal interpretation, how-
ever, every additional assumption which might lead to a further-reaching interpretation remains contro-
versial.
Friebe (2018): Friebe, Cord; Meinard Kuhlmann; Holger Lyre; Paul M. Näger; Oliver Passon; Manfred 
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von Neumann (1932/1955/2018): Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, by John von Neu-
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A. Wheeler. Princeton (UP) 2018
